Struggles Between Factions of the New World Order

It's commonplace for those the bearers of mainstream thought call 'heterodox' to portray the New World Order as though it is a unified phenomenon, and that the monied elites behind its continued development constitute a cohesive body. But I will argue this is not so. The traditional worldview, as opposed to the common one today descended from the European Enlightenment and British Liberalism, would like to view the whole cosmos as a battleground between good and evil, and order and chaos, rather than a rationally ordered whole with the ideals of material progress and supposedly democratic governance.

And that traditional view, as I see it, is mirrored in the current situation of the world today. The global elites do not constitute a whole, but rather a number of relatively discrete groups with varied goals when it comes to the end state. The purpose of this piece is to begin to analyze the situation and who these factions might consist of. As for motives, these can only be guessed at, but given the pursuits of the many actors we will begin to discern something of both motives and goals. But the exercise will perhaps allow readers to think a bit differently about the phenomenon of the New World Order, once they realize that there are many agendas, not only one, being pursued.

Since we are based in the United States for now, it will be apposite to begin with the situation of the elites here. There are power struggles right now between the 'old guard' of globalism and the 'new blood'. The old guard consists of the Masonic Anglo-Saxon establishment and its cronies, along with certain American Jews of a certain bent. The new blood is more varied but it involves an alliance between east coast Catholics and Jews, as well as some other newcomers who have been willing to play the same game. The old guard has much in common, in terms of substance, with the British Empire of yore, including the desire for a global empire of commerce and pet governments to ensure the continuity of that empire. The new blood has a strategy that is perhaps more subtle but it certainly involves maintenance of the 'liberal empire', just with a more internationally oriented strategy of management.

The former group is more likely to be Zionist in its aims, while the latter has become, with the passage of time, more Arabist. But both factions realize that with much of the world's black gold still in the Near East, it simply cannot be abandoned as an imperial project. So the only question that remains is to decide which faction to side with. Note well that the Anglo-Zionists and Sunnite Islam are really not enemies per se. They all have their own interests in the same imperial project. This is something that has confused a great many people on the political right over time. They seem still inclined to believe that Islam and the West are enemies based on a Huntingdon 'clash of the civilizations' model. But this is not so. There is too much wealth and power at stake in their present alliance for it to be abandoned. All of this is not to say that there won't from time to time be blowups and violence, since I do believe that the cultures are mostly incompatible, but a total lapse into disorder along these lines is something the elites will studiously avoid.

Some also want to think that this alliance is new, but it is, I think, actually a resumption of an earlier alliance between Anglo-Zion and the Sunnite Moslems of the British Empire. This project was somewhat derailed due to the fact that many of the countries of the Arab-speaking world were wooed by the Soviet Empire in the 20th century. But the Wahhabi zealots of the Gulf remained on the side of Anglo-Zion through all of that, and through their increasing influence, theologically speaking, upon the Moslem world, they have managed to consolidate Sunnite Islam into a bloc ready to do their bidding, even if only unintentionally. The militant state of the hardline zealot factions, ISIS, is a direct result of the active influence of the Gulf Arabs upon the politics of the region.

The next faction is another major bloc taking shape. The Russians, for a long time isolated on the world stage, have slowly built an alliance with Shiite Islam and the Chinese. This is a tenuous alliance for a number of reasons but what all of the actors have in common is ongoing opposition to the 'liberal empire' of Anglo-Zion. And that means that they will probably stay together despite their own factional struggles. We should also note that it isn't uncommon to include some other states in this bloc but their ultimate loyalty is difficult to gauge and we will therefore leave them out for the time being. The world historical actors are the ones enumerated above. The elites of these countries all have their own visions for the future but my feeling is they are less expansive and universalistic than those of the Western factions, and probably more oriented toward nationalism, as much of the West was 200 years ago.

There is another faction I didn't mention yet because it is the most subtle by far and its operation is hard to detect compared with the out-front, cosmic grade struggle of the ones described already. I call this the Habsburg faction, because it involves, clearly, the elites of Latin American as well as some Catholic Central European countries, and probably does involve, therefore, some of the old Habsburg actors. I really must stress that this group is not identical in aims to the faction of Americanized Catholics that operate on the 'left' in America. Where it appears in America, this faction tends to side with the 'old guard' or 'right' but I have no doubt its ultimate agenda is quite different. I argue also that perhaps its greatest triumphs will be in America itself, despite not being their traditional power base, because the Latin American nations have long been too mired in corruption and chaos to really rise to their full potential.

The 21st century is already set up for a grand showdown between large power blocs and, because of this reality, it is helpful to understand a bit about the factions giving shape to these world historical trends. Nietzsche did predict that the imperial battlefield would grow to embrace the whole earth, and one might be forgiven today for thinking that the events of the twentieth century were not, as they were thought to be then, the harbinger of a new age of peace, but rather an overture to a new era of struggle brought into being by the aftershocks of the Downfall of the West. Some might take issue with that last piece, but I would urge them to think about this: When we speak of the West today, we mean something very different than what was meant when it was spoken of in the beginning of the 20th century.

But the stage of actors in the world is not limited to the activities of globally oriented elites, though those obviously have an outsized influence relative to their numbers. There are also racial, spiritual, cultural and social struggles going on amidst all of this, and at all levels of all of the countries on the face of the earth. Therefore we have to break things down a bit in order to figure out some of what's going on. That is the purpose of this first post in what may become a series of posts on the subject of the New World Order that has unfolded since the end of the World Wars in the 20th century. It is fully my intention to, time permitting, address some of those other struggles too, but as stated, when covering a topic of this magnitude one must take bits at a time.

These factions I have spoken of all have their own world pictures and that is a thing that I will get to in another post, since I don't care to make the posts on this blog too long winded. This is simply a pragmatic concern. It's hard enough to get people to read a few sentences these days, much less long winded blog posts. Now I, as you may have guessed, am a very dedicated reader of books, but the world wide web is not a medium well suited to the presentation of book length material. I therefore want to present the posts on this site more briefly. This is what does work on a blog platform, as evidenced by the approach of many successful blogs I've seen over time.

Musings on the National Question

I was reminded of something when writing the National Idiocies log entry.  The issue of modern groups taking credit for peoples of the past is one of the ones that comes up again and again when we're dealing with national questions.  The Turks are one good example of that, one that I've used many, many times.

The Turks first issued out of the steppes of Inner Asia in Late Antiquity and continued to do so in waves until the end of the Middle Ages.  They were a people of an already intermediate heritage from the perspective of racial typology.  That is, they are somewhere between Caucasoid types and Mongoloid ones, having some of the blood of either type.  This varies from ethnos to ethnos.

The Anatolians who call themselves Turks are another matter entirely.  They are descended mostly from a collection of people that were living there before the Turks ever came marauding through the rugged and dusty lands of Asia Minor.  The Anatolian peoples, Greeks, Armenians, Semites and Hamites all called the place home long before Turks did.

And as it happens, they are the real population of Turkey.  The horde that came after Manzikert numbered probably in the hundreds of thousands in total.  The population of Anatolia was 10-20 millions at the high end.  The Turks made themselves into a ruling class only.  The idea that most of the so-called Turks are their descendants is absurd and wrong.

The issue is a familiar one.  The language was spread by conquerers and eventually adopted by the whole population.  It is my own conviction that this is the same pattern that explains the spread of the so-called Indo-European languages.  That's an issue I'll get to another time.  But the Turks, the real ones that is, were just a ruling class, and one that became more diluted with the passage of time (see the phenomenon of the Osmanlee Sultans taking mainly European wives after the time of Suleiman).

But it remains the case that the Anatolia of Byzantium was mainly the haunt of those previous groups and remains so to this day.  Go to Turkey and you'll see Mediterranean types, you'll see Armenid types, you'll see Hither-Asiatic and Hamitic types, and you'll even see some Nordid elements mixed in from time to time.  But the Central Asian or Turanid type is rare there (though not totally unseen).

This brings me back to the original point.  The masses don't determine much about the character of the nation except its vices.  To establish a real nation requires the presence of a ruling elite sharing blood ties and an elitism that goes beyond shallow vanity - in the Oghuz Turks, this took the form of a Persianate culture.  It is never numerically dominant, but it really is the will and the coherence that counts after all.

There is more to be said on this topic, much more, but I'll leave it there for now.

National Idiocies

The concept of nationalism I think was covered quite ably in the work by Adam Zamoiski.  This man, who supposedly is of aristocratic Polish ancestry and clearly is a proud Catholic, did an estimable job of clearing away the rubble of postmodern discourse concerning nationalism.  He explained very well what in the idea of the nation appeals to the innermost nature of man, and why it remains a persistent idea against all odds (and of course propaganda, which cannot be discounted in the postmodern world).

It is interesting to reflect on his insights.  His research points quite clearly to some interesting issues.  Namely, that nationalism when it arose was not actually of the so-called narrow or chauvinistic type at all.  Instead, it was of a universal type which sought to bring the whole of the nations of Europe and the world into the Enlightenment.  I don't believe a serious study of the record, such as that which he carried out, can leave any doubt that this was so.  The French Revolution and the Polish Uprising against Russian rule were both phenomena carried out to bring sacred Liberty to Europe, tribal chauvinism was the last thing on peoples' minds.

The tribal chauvinist type of nationalism came later.  Of course, even in Zamoiski's works, Germany is blamed for this.  And probably not unfairly, given how events unfolded.  But it is more than a little perverse to impute to them alone a phenomenon that touched all of the men of Europe to greater or lesser degree.  The fact is that the age of the mob was a time of great insecurity, and not least for the German countries that had no tradition of overarching unity that some of the other nations could fall back upon.  Nationalism of the idealistic type was 'easier' in a sense in Poland or France.

The point of this short piece isn't really to dwell altogether on this scenario though.  And the reason is simple.  While nationalism can have its uses in combating the postmodern paradigm which has been called neoliberal or global, it ultimately owes itself to the same source.  The same rejection of the way life was before is a central assumption of nationalism.  There cannot be any doubt that it is equally premised on the Enlightenment ideals.  In fact, in a very real sense, it may be more so.  For the global paradigm is really a sort of Anglo-Saxon or Judaic chauvinism disguised as a world-idea, as many in the Third World have sorted out by now.

Nationalism is decadent and democratic, and it is furthermore used and exploited by the Anglo-Saxon/Judaic paradigm for the creation of Chaos and instability the world over.  This can be seen in the support for the Georgians and the Banderists, the Rohingya and the Kurds, and so on.  The encouragement of petty nationalisms in the name of Liberty can be a potent force for the Anglo-Judaean expansionism.  So, instead of forming itself as a barrier of sorts against the rule of the finance kings and corporati, it actually unwittingly aids it, and we rightists are encouraged by stupified elements calling themselves right wing to accept it because it's nationalistic!

I cannot abide such foolishness.  Instead, I have advocated for formation of new classes or races committed to experimenting on ideas of their own.  This is vaguely similar to the Bowerian or Maguirist approach, but I think we can also see tradition as a guide to another ideal.  The world must be altered to fit the needs of the age, and those needs will not be met with national chauvinisms.  Instead they will be met by genuine formations of ruling castes premised on shared values, and remaining insular and unified in their world view and values.  I think it will take a long time for this to happen, given current circumstances, but it is possible, and we must will it into existence, since the current paradigm is unacceptable.

We need a resurgence of honor, of battlefield fanaticism, and of religious feeling that is genuine rather than contrived.  We need a stable familial system and tradition to keep order on the low levels of society, for without that glue no larger unity is possible.  And we need to encourage men of high character and ideals, because only these are able to sustain the culture that we want to see take shape.  Aesthetics and Romanticism will play a role in this too, but needs to be brought into harmony with the Apollonian and a will to order not present in those former systems - this was the lack of vigilance that allowed the IndRev to come to pass.

I refuse to believe that this is impossible, on the contrary, it must happen, and as soon as possible!  The living cosmos depends on our doing so, without delay.  Let us forever cast away the tramp mire of nationalistic politics and bring into being once more great men - once they are a possibility, the national questions shall become the unimportant trifles they were always meant to be, fading into the background in a cosmos regenerated of life!  The life of ideals, the only life a man can truly find worthy to live!

The Trajectory of the West

It's often the case that people familiar with this topic will say, "one cannot be both Christian and Nietzschean."  That is a misunderstanding of the case, so long as one can understand the issues that were raised.  Nietzsche's opinions with respect to Christianity are often misrepresented as being entirely anti-Christian, but in fact were not so.  He on several occasions praised certain aspects of Christianity.

But the focus, I believe, was always on the servile nature of exoteric Christianity, and also the critique of esoteric Christianity from the perspective that it made too many demands upon human nature to really be applicable.  In both senses the tendency would then be toward nihilism, in the former because of the slavish and ignoble character of the civilization resulting, and in the latter because the ruling caste is too 'far from life' to set this world into proper order.

I would like to disagree, to an extent.  The problem of Christianity in exoteric form being too oriented toward egalitarianism is a real one, but it is one that needn't necessarily dominate if the proper order is allowed to flourish.  In fact, I would say that the esoteric form of Christianity was dominant in the Middle Ages, and was not at all prone to the 'fellaheen spirit'.  That came later, and it was itself, at least in part, the result of many worldly causes that had little to do with Christianity as such.

The modern system came to be amidst a time of great change.  The old system of three castes was already starting to break down by the 15c.  There is good reason to believe that the rise of strong Monarchism in Europe was a trend that aided the bourgeoisie in their rise.  The example of the Capetian Kings using merchants and townsmen as useful allies against powerful aristocratic enemies is well documented, and one could find similar examples many other places.  The other was the transformation of values, namely the vision of order transitioning away from the land-and-faith system to that of an outward-seeking gold-and-plunder motivating idea.

The Middle Ages were a time when some model of Platonic Idealism was put into effect.  Each had his place, the man of arms, the man of intellect, and the man of the soil.  The mercantile and craftsman bourgeoisie remained in this time a small and specialized class.  Also, the priestly caste had a whole host of inner teachings that were not accessible to the public, and the Christian mysticism of that time period was itself only open to initiates.  There was a totally parallel elite and intellectual culture in the Church to what was going on in more worldly circles.  This does not suggest to me a civilization motivated by egalitarianism.

The plebes of Europe had been set adrift by changes that took place with the coming of the Black Death, constant wars between aristocrats, and the decisive event of the weakening of the Universal Church which took place by means of the Renaissance in the South and the Reformation in the North.  Perhaps Nietzsche was correct to criticize the Reformation's excesses, but I tend more toward the Schuon view that the political intransigence of the Church made it more or less inevitable - the controversies of the Cathars in the HMA, or of Wycliffe and Hus later, should have been warning signs.  This could have led to a reform that would have preserved the unity of the Church and the continuity of the proper teaching, while making some important concessions to the Northern Europeans, whose needs were not being addressed.

The dysgenicism of constant war was really also a decisive feature.  The fact is that many great lineages died out due to the interminable conflicts of the MA.  This is why I have always advised against excessive militarism, while being no pacifist.  Sparta is a great example of what comes with it, eventually the helots will take over because the lordly Doric lineages have worn themselves out in endless machy.  But perhaps we ought to give this trend its due in the MA Europe also, since it was clearly present.

The bourgeoisie was simply clever and opportunistic, and in all, they were happy to go along with whichever system most maximized their wealth.  It is my belief that they mainly prospered because they were in a position to exploit the goings-on to their advantage, especially since, as men of peace and commerce, they could make comfortable gains by doing little.  And perhaps even the bourgeoisie of today can still be put to good use, so long as they are not allowed to dominate.

But this still doesn't address the issue of egalitarianism and where it came from as such.  I don't believe, for the reasons I've mapped out, that we can place it decisively at the doorstep of the Church.  There were many spiritual trends arising at the end of the Middle Ages, and the simple answer is, that these trends in both the North and South, contributed decisively to the development of the modern ideology.  Humanism divorced from the virtues of its Classical antecedents, and ideas from the Northern bourgeoisie played very decisive roles in all of this.

The plebeian question compounded the problem.  The plebes had little to do with the grander historical trends, but they were eventually wholly mobilized by the ascendant forces of the bourgeoisie, and it came to be, with the end of aristocratic power from the 18c-20c that the only two remaining castes of any political note would be the urbanized plebes (or proletariate) and the bourgeoisie.  Sadly, this arrangement has clearly, coincident with the rise of technological civilization, made any higher cultural impulses and genuine religion impossible.  The bourgeoisie 'won', that is solved the problem of the conflict with the proles, by exporting the conflict to the Third World, but I don't think that will last.

No one has written enough on these last points from the proper perspective.  It has mostly fallen to Marxists and other left-Hegelian types to talk about any of this.  Perhaps the Traditional types have given it some notice, but it needs more.  Traditional thinking needs to be brought into the mainstream so as to appeal to the men of action.  It is imperative [i]within the next century[/i] that they can intervene and change the course of history away from the Catastrophic course it is now upon.

A clear-eyed examination of postmodernity

The postmodern ideology really suffers from having a near-total divergence between the mindset of the intellectual elite, which is more obscure and consigned to the margins than ever, and the mindset of the masses.  This divergence has always existed to an extent, but in the history of Europe, the men of letters had a great effect in shaping cultural life.  Now, the only thing they are 'useful' for is to churn out scientific and technical innovations, and apart from that to sit and rot in the moth-eaten halls of academia.

I am not terribly interested in most of the currents of science today except for the purer forms, that is physics and mathematics, which are both closest to the old philosophy.  And in these fields, a small remnant of the intellectually rigorous thought of the old times lives on.  The modern physicist might be able to give some due to people like Kant and Schopenhauer for, in their philosophies, predicting many of the things that would now more-or-less be taken for granted.  Among the more enlightened of these, then, the old understanding of metaphysics may be alive and well.

But the popular worldview, and the cultural energies (such as they are), are oriented now toward only the most crass and embarrassing activities.  Science is constantly invoked in the instruments of propaganda, but the masses have no understanding of any of it.  I've come to realize, also, that the pop-science worldview that permeates the MSM and all public spaces, has little in common with actual science.  If anything it's an antipode of science.  It seems to put conclusions ahead of experimentation and trim evidence to fit them as needed, and needless to say, that isn't science.

But the perversion of science to mislead the masses is not really the worst part of it.  Instead it is the total corruption of metaphysics in the West that is worthy of the highest contempt.  Atheism is a kind way of putting it, and doesn't really capture the dark heart of the rot.  Denial of God is bad enough, since I take the traditional European view of these things, but it's really completely beyond that.  It's more along the lines of a nihilistic sensualism that denies anything higher in life.  It's totally focused on vanity, brutality, and hysteria.  This is what is properly called evil.

Even materialism, flawed metaphysic or no, is actually above this.  Materialism must logically imply eternity for anyone who has thought about it for a moment, if the propositions of modern physics are correct.  For matter is energy in a certain state, so they say, and energy is neither created nor destroyed, hence is eternal and only 'transformed'.  This, to me, is eminently compatible with traditional metaphysics so long as we allow for the existence of non-material 'energies' as well (which we must, as the human mind, for instance, is not material), and do not give the world of matter precedence over the inner world from which it proceeds.

I do not believe it would be false to say that the men who built the higher culture of Europe with their unique combination of intellect and psychic energy would be appalled to see where it all lead.  But that is what happens when what Plato called 'the men of iron souls' are allowed to rule.  It cannot but happen, when those who hold the authority are only of the appetitive character.  The dross of postmodernity, shorn of any remaining dignity by advanced technics and social chaos, are adrift in a world that is doomed and their leaders are unable to offer anything more than further decay.

I do not mean to suggest that there is no hope, for hope is one of God's great gifts to man, and is never extinguished so long as even one good or partially good man yet lives.  And I have no doubt that many good men yet live.  But a return to normality would entail a return to the ways of life that make proper human affairs orderly.  The only necessary castes, as observed in the Medieval times, are knight, boor and priest.  No other caste is necessary, and the traditional states that realized this and severely limited commerce were the longest ones to last - Tokugawa Japan, Byzantium.

PS  I hope to add to this a bit more when I am able.

On the Flowering of Peripheral Nations in Modern Times

There are many places that long sat on the periphery of the Western world, and these places often sat in a kind of stagnation for centuries, where nothing much seemed to happen in cultural life.  For my own part, I don't believe that is so, exactly.  They very likely did have lively folk cultures, with all kinds of outpourings of creativity, but they were not recorded or set down in any way for posterity.

This began to change in the Age of Nationalism.  Now, a friend of mine has turned the whole modern idea of nations quite on its head by suggesting that the great man theory is truer than anyone guessed, and that the nation is properly only the vehicle of great men.  I generally agree with this.  Nationalism is not something devoutly to be wished as it represents in most of its modern expressions a degenerate tendency toward collectivism.

I would say that the exception is when the nation can be a muse to the creative type, to the aesthete.  In these, admittedly rare, cases, it can manifest as a force for good.  In the aforementioned peripheral nations, this was very much the case, and the Western world was better off for these, often very un-Western expressions of vital force.

In particular, I suppose it makes sense to focus on a couple of test cases.  For one, we could look at Finland.  The Finn is a peripheral type not only culturally, but probably racially as well.  However, he is a hybrid type (having some constituents from the West), though he has a peculiar dark soul that harmonizes more with the East than the West (though he hates, say, Russians despite their similarities).

The Finns had a tradition of oral poetry that stemmed from their unique mythological views.  This was eventually channeled, thanks to a cultural awakening in the 19c, into such works as the Kalevala, which is a creative systemization of folk beliefs and stories.  Also of note is the musical tradition, wherein Finns finally made serious and lasting contributions to the classical music of Europe.

The Finns also developed a lively intellectual life in the 20c which included giving birth to some of the centuries most interesting thinkers.  Anyone can pursue the Finnish contributions to philosophy, for example, if interested.  Finland has made, in a short time, outsized contributions.

Another place that deserves significant mention is Romania.  This land was ruled for centuries by the Osmanlees, though it actually was a great nation in the Medieval period with crusading kings of high vigor.  Nevertheless, it stagnated during foreign rule.  But again, it did revive quite a bit in time to make some very worthy contributions to European thought in the 20c.

Among the most interesting philosophical and theological writers of the 20c were Romanians, and their culture flowered during the brief interwar period.  Nevertheless, the amount and quality of its offerings shall stand in perpetuity as evidence of the greatness that, for the time being, rests more as potentiality than actuality.

So, nationalism, if it proved a fertile ground for some grand cultural output, can have its uses.  But I must stress that this is dependent on the competence of individual creative genius.  Aesthetic and intellectual outpourings are not the preserve of the masses, and they require a caste of gentlemen for continuity.  This is yet another topic that deserves a healthy amount of further inquiry.

Anthropology of France and Some Consequences Thereof

The reputation of France has taken a severe beating in the Anglosphere, and nowhere more so than on our own shores.  The French are routinely viewed as the laughingstock of Western Europe.  The purpose of my post today has little interest in hashing over whether this is just or not, or looking at the causes of French decline, or any of that.  And I frankly don't care, nor share, American opinions on that subject for the most part.

It's easy to forget, though, given the latent hostility we see toward France today, that it was once Europe's great nation, the people who all strove to be like, the heart of high culture, the seat of the noble values.  This is something that will emerge as an indisputable fact for anyone who takes the time to study European history.  The foundation that Charlemagne put down was good, it was sturdy to last 1000 years, and so it did.

But I would like to propose a particular, and often ignored, aspect of the French people, that contributed to their balance of talents which made them the foremost of Europe's great nations.  I would like to propose that this owed, in part of course, to a diverse racial origin which is not shared with some of the other prominent nations.  What I mean will become clear shortly.

The other nations of Germany and England, who became great in their turn, were of a primarily Teutonic type, while the Spain, Portugal and Italy were of a primarily Latin type.  These are generalizations, but the degree of hybridization was either less in these nations, or located at such a distant point in the past as to already have contributed decisively to the character of the people when they were formed.

But France was not so.  The French people were formed from a late hybridization.  First of all, it was the home of the Gauls, and they were conquered and Latinized.  However, I don't believe what actually happened was the emergence of a new race, the Gallo-Roman.  Then, to make matters more confused, a race of Teutons called the Franks invaded, and added their own contributions.  The nations of Occitania and Francia emerged as a result of these historical happenings.

Physical anthropologists have noted that the population of France is a relatively proportional mix of all types.  The Nordic, the Alpine, and the Mediterranean type are all observed here, and all in roughly equal measure.  Of course, there has been considerable mixing given all of the time since, but there is no real denial that France must be the closest thing to a 'balanced nation' that Europe has.

I'm not actually arguing for a hybrid vigor, along the lines of some leftist types, but instead that the strange coming together of so many different types created a sort of harmony of Apollonian and Dionysian urges, out of which was birthed the unconventional character of the Frenchman.  I am of the firm belief that the different types all bring their own unique characters, and what gave France its enduring power was playing these off one another to achieve a kind of synergy.

Nations that are strongly Teutonic tend to become, if you will, either too calculating and utilitarian, taking the example of the Dutch and English, or a bit too rigid and dogmatic, after the fashion of the German or the Swede.  Latin nations tend to be internally unstable and inherently fractious, as we see in Italy, or so hidebound as to become stagnant, as in Spain.  They also tend to excel in wanton cruelty.  But the French managed to achieve the right balance.

The downside is that the harmony that birthed it allowed for a sort of creative genius that for long surpassed the others.  But the opposing forces, as I've tried to paint here, spun out of control.  The French started to degenerate into a passionate anarchy once the aristocracy lost its grip.  It was further negatively impacted by the Napoleonic and World War exertions, to the point that it was severely depleted of vigor.  This is the great tragedy of the French people.

Nevertheless, this group prospered for a much longer time than is generally recognized, despite their many shortcomings.  The swings between order and anarchy have been seen before there, and who knows when the polarity will again reverse?  This is certainly a matter worthy of closer study and lasting research, by the way, and I hope that my little investigation here is just a primer for future works.

Placeholder

This is a placeholder, to serve as a reminder for material to be published in the near future:

-The concept of Devolution, and the role of Progress Myth in masking this.  The Myth systems mention this across the world.

-The nature of Spenglerian thought as against that of GCR and Evolian thought.  Merits and weaknesses of all.

-The status of ethnos in America and the troubles ahead.  Unrest in large cities.

-Lindstedtian and Breckian thought, men who were ahead of their time and clearer-eyed than they received credit for.

-Reconsidered racial classifications.

-Philosophical gleanings, the role of Hellenic metaphysics in the slaying of materialistic nonsense, etc.

-American political ineptitude as a consequence of low bioquality of population.

-Socialists make awful allies, don't look for allies among the demos.

-Stalinism was effective tactic to stave off decay that comes with bourgeois rule, but ultimately couldn't be sustained and cost was terminal to Russia.

-America since "Civil Rights":  50 years of decay

-Hippies, or the last survivors of Romanticism, or the peaceful side of that coin.

-Catholicism in America:  Was it already a vehicle for Illuminism very early?

-The need for great men as a catalyst for nations and high culture.

-German ideas, Christianity and Nietzsche

-Islam and the Regime as part of the same problem

-Celtic and Teutonic Myth and Legend

-"Letting nature take its course" and the demise of the postmodern state?

-Magic, Occultism and its historic uses by both aristocrats of old and the modern state

-Racialism and how it relates to the good society, individual types

-Refined classification of contemporary ideologies and assessment of demographic trends.

The Two Worlds

Old James Burnham always said that true Liberals are wary of authority.  They don't want to use violence, and usually when they have to, they don't do it the right way.  And they don't psychologically accept hierarchy and authority comfortably.  This is all a hallmark of their origins in the bourgeoisie, to whom the proper way to rule does not come naturally.

I don't agree with Burnham in many ways.  I believe he was a progenitor of the neocon mentality, though he can hardly be blamed for that group's current excesses.  But he had that hoary old amoral apologist for power in him, that has defined so many of the modern pseudo-conservatives.  This shows how morally rudderless and adrift the remnant British Americans are.

But after that exchange with Sandor I'm reminded of James Clavell.  He was himself of the military caste, and was captured in WWII by the Japanese, where he spent 3 years at Changi Prison in Singapore.  He wrote novels primarily about capitalists expanding in Asia (although not in Shogun, although the person of James Blackthorne was not at all dissimilar to his other protagonists).

What is striking about the entire exercise is the idealized nature of the characters.  James Clavell clearly paints pictures of Aryo-Nordic adventurers, and all but declares in a loud voice that these are the ones who are responsible for capitalism.  There is nothing of the modern, spineless, drone businessman of modern times.

There was blond Englishman Blackthorne, ruddy Scotsman Struan, and the tough, self reliant American King.  Even the villains were usually of the noble caste.  Quillan Gornt and Igor Mzytryk don't come across like milquetoasts in the least little bit. Compare with modern day beta and less males of the office environments and laugh heartily.

And I am largely in agreement with him vis-a-vis the type who built capitalism in the imperial sense.  They weren't managerial types, or more properly adjusted for historical context, shopkeep types.  They were risk-taking soldiers and ruthless buccaneers.  They ran over opposition, manipulated and intimidated when it suited them, and took women from local populations for wives.

All of this is very much in keeping with the Gobineau worldview, as indeed Ayn Rand's works also were (who Clavell claimed as an influence).  There is, so far, little I can object to.  I like his depiction of capitalism, and self-aware or no, he's pretty candid in his portrayals.  But this again brings up the question - what happened?

Modern capitalism has ever so little in common with this type of man.  I have argued in the past that the Aryan type turned over power to the bourgeoisie without much of a fight.  The action was the important part for that kind of man, and once it was completed, the wealth didn't mean much.

The bourgeoisie, who do not have it in them to rule as divine order requires, nevertheless got around this issue in a novel way.  They took the man of action and used him to build their empires, profiting without any of the risk.  And this has continued to the present day.  This is not, I must stress, a matter of 'outwitting' the aristocrat, which I generally don't think they are good at.  It's more like using his essential nature against him.

This is really the issue, the aristocratic and Aryan type doesn't value what the bourgeoisie does, and it is the fundamental divide between their worlds of life that makes it possible for the one to 'dominate' the other.  Quite simply, the Aryan is out of place in the modern world.  He still could dominate, but it would require an awareness of the gravity of the situation that he hasn't, at least not yet.

I'd like to commend Clavell for, probably unwittingly, bringing attention to all of this by way of his novels.